



November 30, 2016 
POLICY BRIEF 
First you stop digging: Projections of Illinois' fiscal imbalance and paths to remedy it 
By Richard Dye and David Merriman 
"If you find yourself in a hole, stop digging."  (Will Rogers) 
I. Introduction 
The state of Illinois has operated for many years with a structurally unbalanced budget in 
the sense that, under the policies in place at the time, government revenue generated by the tax 
system was insufficient to pay for government spending under current law. We and our 
colleagues have documented this in many reports over many years.1 In order to understand and 
quantify Illinois' structural balance or imbalance better, we launched the Fiscal Futures Project 
in 2008 with support from the University of Illinois, a variety of civic organizations across the 
political spectrum, and substantial funding from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur 
Foundation.2  
The Fiscal Futures Project, developed, refined and now maintains a computer model of the 
Illinois state budget. The model is designed to enable cross-year comparisons of state revenue 
and expenditures in consistent and comprehensive categories. Doing this makes it possible to 
trace Illinois' fiscal history and to make meaningful projections about likely future paths under 
a variety of assumptions about economic conditions and policies. In its current incarnation, the 
model, which is fully and transparently documented,3 begins with very detailed data supplied 
in electronic form by the Illinois Comptroller’s office. The data supplied by the Comptroller’s 
office covers essentially all state spending and revenue, appropriated and non-appropriated 
and within both general and special funds. We have dubbed the budget we analyze the "all-
funds" budget to distinguish it from the "general funds" budget that is typically the focus of 
media and public policy attention. We have taken the thousands of individual items detailed in 
the Comptroller data and aggregated them to meaningful categories that can be consistently 
compared across years. Currently, our model begins with 190,000 individual data items from 
fiscal years 1998 through 2016.  
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Because we categorize revenue by type, our model can distinguish between on-going (i.e., 
sustainable) and one-time (i.e., transitory) revenue. Also, because we have solid data on Illinois' 
historical patterns of consistently categorized spending and revenue, we are able to document 
past experience and to use these data to estimate economic determinants of spending and 
revenue. Most importantly, we can combine information about past historical patterns with 
independent projections about future economic activity, population change, and other factors to 
make projections about future spending and revenue under current law. We can also simulate 
future sustainable revenue and spending under several alternative policy choices.  
In January 2015, a report from Fiscal Futures using a previous, but quite similar, version of 
our model, summarized Illinois' precarious fiscal situation as follows: 
1. A deficit of $6 billion on "all funds" spending of roughly $72 billion during fiscal 
year 2015; 
2. A projected gap of around $9 billion per year for the next five; 
3. "Legacy costs" or unfunded liabilities for retiree pensions and health care of $152 
billion;  
4. Unpaid bills for services already provided to the state of $6.5 billion.4 
It is something of an understatement to say that Illinois has not made substantial fiscal 
progress following that discouraging report. Republican Governor Bruce Rauner and the 
Democrat-controlled General Assembly were unable to agree on a comprehensive budget for 
FY16. The Illinois personal income tax rate fell from 5 percent to 3.75 percent and the corporate 
income tax rate fell from 7 percent to 5.25 percent in accordance with legislation that had been 
enacted in early 2011. Only a few spending items were both approved by the General Assembly 
and signed into law by the governor. Despite this, as we detailed in a report in February 2016, 
spending continued in many categories as a result of continuing appropriations, consent 
decrees, and court orders.5 
Illinois legislators and the governor also were unable to agree on a comprehensive FY2017 
budget, although a few categories of spending—most notably K-12 education—were funded for 
the entire year and most other spending categories received a six-month appropriation of about 




We combined the most recent data available (as of the end of October 2016) from the 
Comptroller with our model to calculate the same four measures of Illinois' fiscal condition 
reported in January 2015. Under current (baseline) policies we find: 
1. A deficit of around $13 billion for the current year (FY2017)  
2. A projected gap of around $14 billion per year for the next five years 
3. "Legacy costs" for unfunded liabilities for retiree pensions and health care of $174 
billion7  
4. Unpaid bills for services already provided to the state of $10 billion8 
As our analysis will demonstrate, it is almost certainly not feasible to remedy imbalances of 
this magnitude by policy changes in a single year. Rather, climbing out of the hole that Illinois is 
in likely will require hard choices, fiscal discipline and sustained attention over a long period of 
time. Because of this, our analyses put particular emphasis on projecting the implications of 
sustained multi-year policy changes that move Illinois toward fiscal balance. 
II. New projections from the Fiscal Futures Model 
Since its formation in 2008, the Fiscal Futures Project has attempted continually to improve 
and refine our data gathering and analysis procedures while simultaneously maintaining 
relevance and compatibility with previous reports. The current version of the model 
incorporates a number of important innovations. Most importantly, we now directly 
incorporate detailed electronic data supplied by the Illinois Comptroller’s office. In previous 
versions of the model, we incorporated data that we gathered essentially by hand from the 
Comptroller's website. Thanks to generous cooperation of the staff of the late Comptroller Judy 
Barr Topinka and her successor Leslie Munger, we have now been able to incorporate extensive 
and very detailed electronic data on categories of past and current spending and revenue. This 
should make it possible for our reports to be more accurate, timely and detailed. We detail other 
less significant changes in our model and procedures in our on-line documentation.9 We 
emphasize however that the basic logic and findings of our projection model are very similar to 
those of earlier models. 
Before discussing our projections in detail we note that, as a result of Illinois' virtually 
unprecedented budgeting arrangements since July of 2015, there is an unusual amount of 
uncertainty about the state's current spending. In particular, the very slow payment of invoices 
by the state makes it difficult to predict exactly what spending has occurred in a number of 
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areas. Also, much FY2016 spending occurred without explicit legislative approval and spending 
during the first half of FY2017 was largely determined by historical precedent rather than 
explicit legislative activity. Because the Fiscal Futures Model uses current spending together 
with the historical experience and expected future economic activity to project future spending, 
lack of solid data on current spending makes implementation of the model more difficult. In 
particular, we have more uncertainty than usual about the baseline level of spending that we 
use in our projections. In the end, we decided to use FY2015 spending as the benchmark for 
projecting spending in subsequent years.  
Figure 1 shows observed total all-funds revenue (from FY1998-2016) and expenditures (from 
FY1998-2015) and projections through FY2027 for each by the Fiscal Futures Model reflecting 
current policy and past trends. Figure 1 also shows the "budget gap," that is, the difference 
between sustainable total revenue and total expenditure for each year. A negative budget gap is 
called a "deficit."  
Figure 1: Historical and projected totals for Illinois all-funds  
revenues, expenditures and budget gap FY1998-2027 
 
Note: As indicated by the dashed lines, the projection period for revenue starts in FY2017 while spending and 
budget gap projections start in FY2016. Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Model, November 2016.  
Readers of our past work will not be surprised by the historical data. We show all-funds 
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funds counterparts. Historical deficits emerged as early as 2001 and were over $10 billion in 
2004 when Illinois issued a very large set of pension obligation bonds. Large gaps also emerged 
after the recession of 2008 but deficits, while still quite large, narrowed a bit between 2011 and 
2014 when the temporary personal income tax increase was in place. The future trend is 
ominous, however, with large and growing deficits in each year. Projected annual deficits grow 
to more than $20 billion by 2027. The projected deficits grow because, over the 11-year period 
from 2017 to 2027, the model projects annual expenditure growth of 3.9 percent but annual 
revenue growth of only 3.6 percent.10 
But these projections actually understate the severity of Illinois' fiscal problems for several 
reasons. The annual budget gap is an "income statement" concept that does not include the 
"balance sheet" dimensions of the state's problems. Annual budget gap projections do not take 
into account changes in unfunded pension liabilities, which are projected to grow by another 
$15 billion between FY2017 and FY2017, even though, as assumed here, Illinois makes currently 
scheduled pension payments. Also not included in these projections are increases in unpaid 
bills or the cost of servicing state debt should budget gaps of the projected magnitude arise. 
Another caution is that all-funds revenue growth rates estimated by the model exceed general 
fund revenue growth rate projections reported by the Governor's Office of Management and 
Budget.11 Because of these and other issues, our projections should not be taken as forecasts of 
Illinois' future fiscal position. Rather they should be thought of as rough measures of the 
magnitude of the fiscal challenge Illinois faces. 
III. Projections of alternative policies: Paths to reform 
The baseline scenario shown in Figure 1 is probably not sustainable as it would require 
extreme forbearance from Illinois' suppliers and creditors. Also, budgets with deficits as large as 
we project might be subject to a court challenge that they violate provisions of the Illinois 
Constitution limiting the governor and General Assembly to spending available funds. Even if 
such budget deficits were fiscally and legally sustainable, executing them would result in large 
stocks of government debt that would eventually have to be retired and would probably 
hamper economic activity in Illinois.  
What are the alternatives to maintaining current revenue and expenditure policies? 
Alternatives to the baseline scenario come in essentially three flavors: (a) reduce spending, (b) 
increase tax rates or expand tax bases, or (c) generate more economic growth, which would in 
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turn make it possible to generate more tax revenue at current tax rates while potentially holding 
or cutting spending. Our simulations examine each of these possibilities and show that none by 
itself is likely to be sufficient to close the budget gap and that, even if we model all of these 
potential policies and scenarios together, closing the budget gap is likely to be challenging and 
to take many years.  
We examine a number of scenarios that together encompass all three flavors. Of course, 
there are many additional scenarios that we do not examine here, and our projections are based 
on relatively simple models and assumptions. We do not necessarily advocate or oppose any of 
the scenarios we examine, but rather we offer them as illustrative of the general order of 
magnitude of actions that would be required to close the budget gap.  
a.) Spending cuts  
We begin with reducing government spending. In this scenario, we assume that all 
discretionary spending is reduced by 200 basis points (i.e., two percentage points) below the 
model-projected growth rate each year after 2015.  By the year 2027 projected spending on these 
discretionary categories of spending would be approximately 20 percent lower than in the 
baseline case.  We exclude from these cuts the following categories of expenditure because we 
view them as operationally, even if not legally, non-discretionary. 
 Scheduled payments to state pension funds (otherwise unfunded liabilities would 
increase); 
 Scheduled payments to service state debt in the form of bonds (a contractual 
obligation); 
 Transfers of revenue to local governments (linked to various revenue sources); 
 State grants to K-12 education (because in 2016 and 2017 school aid was fully 
funded, not because such a large category of spending should necessarily be off 
limits); 
 Transportation spending, including the Tollway Authority (because the November 
2016 amendment to the state constitution protects these); 
 Medicaid spending, because many of the programs protected from spending cuts in 




Together these excluded expenditures constituted over two-thirds of total expenditures in 
FY2015. Cuts of this magnitude on the remaining "discretionary" spending categories would be 
quite substantial and would undoubtedly result in substantial hardship to vulnerable 
populations if they were introduced on an across-the-board basis as we simulate here. Of 
course, the same total cut in expenditures could be introduced in a more targeted basis with the 
same net effect on the budget gap.  
Figure 2 shows Fiscal Futures Model projections of 2 percent per year cuts in "discretionary" 
spending. (See Table 1 at the end of this report for numerical values.) The spending-cut policy 
that we simulate would have a modest initial effect causing the budget gap to fall (relative to 
projections) by $900 million in FY2017. However, the impact of this policy would grow over 
time and by 2027 we project that the policy would cut the budget gap by roughly $7.2 billion or 
32 percent. However, as drastic as these cuts would be, we project that this would leave a 
substantial and probably unsustainable budget gap of more than $15 billion annually even in 
FY2027. 
Figure 2: Projected budget gaps with and without spending cuts 
 

































































b.) Income tax rate increase 
 We also simulate a variety of policies to enhance revenue. The most straight-forward and 
easily implementable revenue policy that we examine is one that has been widely discussed—
increases in the personal and corporate income tax rates. The personal income tax in particular 
is a major source of revenue, providing approximately $12 billion annually, which is a little less 
than one-half of general fund tax revenue in FY2017. We simulate an increase in the personal 
income tax rate to 4.75 percent from the current 3.75 percent effective January 1, 2017. At the 
same time, we increase the corporate tax rate to 6.65 percent (from the current 5.25 percent, 
preserving the 1.4-to-1 ratio with the individual rate) with the same effective date. The higher 
rates are assumed to continue past January 1, 2025 when, in the current-law baseline, they are 
scheduled to fall to 3.25 percent for individuals and 4.8 percent for corporations. 
We project that increasing income tax rates would substantially increase tax revenue, 
causing a substantial fall in the budget gap (Figure 3). The reduction in the budget gap 
compared to the baseline would be large, $2 billion in FY2017, when the higher rates apply for 
half the year, and $4.2 billion in FY2018, with the higher rates effective for the full year. 
However, because the increase in the tax rate does nothing to change either the rate of growth 
of revenue or expenditures, revenue in the model would still grow more slowly than 
expenditures, so that over time the budget gap would begin to grow again. By FY2027, the 
budget gap in this scenario would be more than $14 billion annually or more than 60 percent as 
large as it would have been if we had kept to the original tax rates.  
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Figure 3: Projected budget gaps with and without income tax rate increases 
to individual rate of 4.75% and corporate rate of 6.65% 
 
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Model, November 2016. See Table 1 at end of this report. 
c.) Income tax base increase 
 An alternative to increasing income tax rates is to broaden the income tax base by taxing 
some sources of income that are now excluded. Since the personal income tax is expected to 
generate about $12 billion of revenue in FY2017, expanding the tax base by 10 percent would 
draw approximately $1.2 billion dollars in additional revenue. A 2016 analysis by the Illinois 
Comptroller identified three types of credits or subtractions in the Illinois personal income tax 
that lowered revenue by a combined amount of almost $3 billion in FY2015.12 These are the 
exemption of retirement and social security income that is taxed by the federal government 
($2.3 billion), the tax credit for residential real estate taxes ($0.6 billion) and the K-12 education 
expense credit ($0.08 billion). Eliminating roughly 40 percent of these exemptions would be 
essentially equivalent to broadening the personal income tax base by 10 percent. 
The same 2016 Illinois Comptroller study identified more than $300 million of tax 
expenditures that applied to the corporate income tax. Since the corporate income tax is 
expected to raise about $1.9 billion in FY2017, eliminating $190 million of tax expenditures is 
essentially equivalent to expanding the corporate income tax base by 10 percent. Our 





























































With Higher Tax Rates
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corporate income tax bases by 10 percent effective January 1, 2017. We do not specify the 
mechanisms that would be used to do this, but as explained above, such a tax base expansion 
could be engineered by reducing or eliminating some currently allowed tax expenditures.  
Figure 4 shows our projections of budget gaps with and without the 10 percent expansions 
of the personal and corporate tax bases. The tax base expansions reduce projected gaps 
substantially less than either of the two policies examined earlier. In FY2017, with the tax base 
expansion assumed to be in effect for half the year, we project that the budget gap would fall by 
about $770 million. In FY2018, with the policy in effect for the full year, the projected deficit is 
reduced by $1.6 billion or 12 percent. While we project that the amount of the reduction in the 
budget gap would grow slightly over time—to about $1.8 billion by 2027—the percentage 
reduction would decline as spending continues to grow faster than revenue.  
Figure 4: Projected budget gaps with and without income tax base expansion by ten percent 
 
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Model, November 2016. See Table 1 at end of this report. 
d.) Sales tax base increase 
 In addition to the income tax, Illinois' other main source of tax revenue is the sales tax, 
raising roughly $11 billion in FY2016. A 2011 report by Illinois' Commission on Governmental 
Forecasting and Accountability (COGFA) found that, compared to other states, Illinois' sales tax 
covered a relatively narrow range of services.13 The report found that the service sector's share 





























































With Higher Income Tax Base
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estimated that the sales tax could raise $8.5 billion in additional tax revenue if the base was 
broadened to include a wide range of services including business-to-business transactions. If a 
narrower base that excluded business-to-business transactions was used, the report found that 
potential additional revenue was $4 billion. A $4 billion increase in sales tax revenue would 
have been approximately equivalent to broadening the sales tax base by 36 percent in FY2016 
when sales tax revenue was about $11 billion. However, there are a number of reasons to 
believe that base broadening of this magnitude through the taxation of services would be 
administratively and politically challenging.14 Because of this, we project the revenue impact to 
be a 15 percent increase in the base of the general sales tax. This is done to approximate the 
order of magnitude of adding a number of services to the sales tax base, which currently taxes 
mostly just goods. The effective date of this change is assumed to be July 1, 2017, the beginning 
of fiscal year 2018.  
Figure 5 indicates our projections of an increase in the sales tax base by 15 percent. This, 
taken alone, would lower the gap by about $2 billion per year. However, sales tax base 
expansion would do nothing to change the rate of growth of expenditures and only slightly 
change the rate of growth of revenue (since service consumption grows faster than goods 
consumption),15 so we project that the budget gap would continue to grow. 
Figure 5: Projected budget gaps with and without sales tax base expansion by 15% 
 































































With Higher Sales Tax Base
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e.) Increasing Illinois's underlying economic growth rate 
 In previous reports, we analyzed the potential of economic growth to raise more revenue 
and found that it was unlikely that economic growth alone could eliminate the structural 
budget deficit.16 That said, if the state gets its fiscal house in order and enacts other policies to 
encourage economic activity, revenue growth could contribute to fiscal balance in the longer 
term.  
Our next projection assumes that, through some combination of policies and improved 
business and consumer confidence, Illinois is able to achieve an extra one-half of 1 percent 
growth in personal income each year starting in FY2018.  Achieving sustained additional 
growth of this magnitude would be quite different from past history and likely extraordinarily 
challenging.17 Further, the scenario assumes—contrary to the specification of the Fiscal Futures 
Model—that higher income affects revenue but not spending.18 The major revenue categories 
assumed to be affected by higher growth are personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, 
and sales taxes.19  
Figure 6 illustrates the fiscal impact of the assumed increase in the economic growth rate 
and shows a very modest projected fiscal impact from increased growth in personal income. 
The budget gap would fall by just $0.1 billion (i.e., $100 million) compared to the baseline in 
2018, and by the end of the decade, it would lower the budget gap just $1.5 billion (or about 6.6 
percent). 
f.) Combined effect of multiple policies 
 As the above analyses demonstrate, none of the individual policies we have examined 
would, by themselves, be sufficient to close the budget gap within the next decade. In fact, none 
of the policies would change the structural deficit caused by spending growing more rapidly 
than revenue. What if we enacted several of the proposed changes simultaneously? Could this 
close the budget gap? Note that the savings from each scenario cannot simply be added up for 
the combined effect. For example, simultaneously increasing the income tax rate and 
broadening the income tax base increases tax revenue more than the sum of those two separate 
policies since the higher tax rate would also apply to the broadened base. 
As shown in Figure 7, our model projects that the combined effect of all of the policy 
changes we have discussed—substantially reducing spending growth, increasing income tax 
rates, broadening both the sales and income tax bases, and increasing the economic growth 
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rate—would be just sufficient to close the budget gap if we can implement these policies soon 
and maintain them over the next decade. 
Figure 6: Projected budget gaps with and without higher personal income growth  
of one-half of 1 percent each year 
 
Source: IGPA's Fiscal Futures Model, November 2016. See Table 1 at end of this report. 
Figure 7: Projected budget gaps with all discussed policies implemented  
(i.e., all of the policies shown separately in Figures 2-6) 
 



























































































































With All 5 Policies Combined
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Notice from Figure 7 that our projections of these combined policies suggest that, compared 
to the baseline, most of the budget gap would eliminated within a few years. We project the 
budget gap would fall from $9.4 billion in 2017 to $2 billion in 2021. Despite this rapid 
improvement, continued vigilance would be necessary because the reversal of these policies 
could easily create a situation where revenue once again would grow more slowly than 
expenditures resulting in a new and widening budget imbalance.  
Figure 7 is somewhat encouraging in that it shows a plausible, if challenging, path to fiscal 
sustainability. But we caution that even this set of policies and circumstances might not be 
enough. Our arithmetic simulations of what it would take to eliminate Illinois' annual deficit in 
10 years do not take into account several important dimensions of Illinois' fiscal situation.  
First, to eliminate the $10 billion backlog of unpaid bills due to past deficits would require 
even larger tax increases and spending cuts. 
Second, all of the policies we project result in deficits continuing for a number of years. This 
means that Illinois would have pay for the deficits on its balance sheet with either decreased 
assets or increased liabilities. Increase liabilities could take the form of either explicit loans or 
bonded debt or implicitly borrowing in the form of a higher stack of unpaid bills. Even if Illinois 
adopted the policies envisioned in Figure 7, we project that it would accumulate more than $25 
billion of additional deficits by 2027. Financing these deficits involves a claim against state 
resources in future years and would require even larger tax increases or spending cuts, or some 
form of borrowing that must eventually be paid off by future taxpayers.  
Third, recent estimates put Illinois' unfunded pension liability at $129.8 billion with pension 
fund assets covering only 37.2 percent of total liabilities.20 The payment schedule for state 
contributions to the pension plans incorporated in the model's spending projections is based on 
actuarial calculations designed to achieve a funded ratio (assets/liabilities) of 90 percent by 2045. 
To achieve 100 percent funding or to achieve it sooner than 2045 would require an even greater 
diversion of state resources to pension contributions over the next 10 years.21 
 
III. Conclusion: Fiscal balance will require sacrifice, diligence, cooperation and persistence  
We remind readers that, while our analyses are based on the best and most recently 
available data, our model makes a number of simplifying assumptions to turn past trends into  
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projections of future spending and revenue. As such, our analyses should be thought of not as 
precise forecasts, but as rough but unbiased measures of the order of magnitude of Illinois' 
fiscal challenges. Ultimately, the challenges may be smaller, but they may also be larger. What is 
clear from our analyses is that, even in the best case, Illinois will face a sustained period of 
extremely difficult fiscal conditions. It is also clear that without significant policy actions 
Illinois' current fiscal path is unsustainable. Unless new policies are adopted, spending will 
grow faster than revenue and Illinois will face large budgetary deficits and will be unable to 
clear away past liabilities. 
 We see no plausible path to sustained fiscal stability without sacrifice—Illinois will need to 
simultaneously increase revenue and cut spending. But fiscal austerity alone will not guarantee 
success. Increasing revenue, especially through taxation, could discourage economic activity 
and be counter-productive in the long run. Any revenue enhancement policy should be 
carefully thought through and be consistent with continued vibrant economic activity. 
Similarly, budget cuts could be counter-productive if they neglect festering social problems that 
end up costing even more to deal with in the long run. Furthermore, budget cuts that reduce 
services essential to the smooth operation of the economy could reduce economic activity and 
ultimately lead to even larger budget gaps. 
 What is needed is a "grand plan" that includes multiple spending cuts, multiple new sources 
of revenue, and spreads these adjustments over multiple years in the form of even more 
borrowing. Finding the right mix of policies—sharing the pain of digging out of the hole that 
we are in—will require cooperation among a broad spectrum of groups in this policy arena. 
Groups will not only have to compromise among themselves but will have to engender 
confidence that they are committed to sustained action to fill in the budget hole. In the absence 
of a clear signal of a long-term commitment to this goal, neither workers nor business owners 
can be expected to make the necessary investments to build Illinois' fiscal future.  
 Credible long-term commitments to fiscal solvency may require a new level of budget 
transparency and new budgetary mechanisms that can be used to enforce budgetary discipline. 
We have in the past written extensively about potential mechanisms to improve Illinois' 
budgetary transparency.22 Simultaneously with this report, we are releasing a second paper that 
describes research about budget enforcement mechanisms—ways of constraining the actions of 
multiple constituencies in multiple years.23  
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We hope these papers will be a useful resource for policymakers and all Illinoisans as the 
state tries to address its unprecedented budget problems, because we believe that adoption of 
additional measures to ensure transparency and mechanisms to encourage sustained 
enforcement of agreements about budget discipline could do much to inspire public confidence 
in Illinois' commitment to fiscal stability. Ultimately these measures may be an important tool to 
encourage citizens’ and businesses’ investment in Illinois' future. 
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Table 1: Illinois All-Funds Total Expenditure, Total Revenue and Budget Gap Projections FY 2015-2027 
For Current Policy Baseline and Five Alternative Policy Scenarios ($ millions) 
Policy 
Option 







































2015 71,299 64,211 -7,088 -7,088 -7,088 -7,088 -7,088 -7,088 -7,088 
2016 73,533 61,581 -11,952 -11,508 -11,952 -11,952 -11,952 -11,952 -11,508 
2017 76,765 63,581 -13,184 -12,277 -11,164 -12,417 -13,184 -13,184 -9,389 
2018 79,344 65,751 -13,593 -12,200 -9,415 -12,012 -11,812 -13,474 -4,094 
2019 82,256 68,234 -14,022 -12,118 -9,703 -12,386 -12,188 -13,775 -3,579 
2020 84,513 70,802 -13,711 -11,266 -9,252 -12,020 -11,821 -13,329 -2,284 
2021 88,008 73,580 -14,428 -11,412 -9,830 -12,682 -12,480 -13,902 -1,971 
2022 91,715 76,528 -15,187 -11,567 -10,445 -13,384 -13,176 -14,505 -1,644 
2023 95,580 79,564 -16,016 -11,760 -11,128 -14,155 -13,942 -15,170 -1,338 
2024 99,524 81,368 -18,156 -13,230 -11,821 -16,369 -16,020 -17,175 -995 
2025 103,736 83,330 -20,406 -14,771 -12,543 -18,695 -18,203 -19,292 -614 
2026 108,312 86,806 -21,507 -15,118 -13,389 -19,738 -19,233 -20,209 -289 
2027 113,031 90,428 -22,602 -15,416 -14,222 -20,775 -20,257 -21,110 114 
Notes:  Total Expenditure in FY2016 is projected, not actual. 
Budget Gap = Total Sustainable Revenue – Total Expenditure. 
Spending Growth Cut simulates spending 2 percent below baseline-projected levels each year for all categories except pensions, debt service, K-12 
education, Medicaid, revenue transfers to local government, transportation and tollway.  
Increase Income Tax Rates simulates personal income tax rate rise to 4.75 percent and corporate income tax rate rise to 6.65 percent effective 
January 1, 2017. 
Increase Income Tax Base simulates expansion of the personal and corporate tax bases by 10 percent effective January 1, 2017. 
Increase Sales Tax Base simulates expansion of general sales tax base by 15 percent effective July 1, 2017. 
Increase Income Growth simulates 0.5 percent increase in growth rate of personal income each year starting in FY2018. 
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